Plato and the Metaphysics of The Laws – Discourses on Minerva
Plato’s dialogue The Laws is his largest and most significant work. It is not merely a work of political philosophy but it is also work of philosophy proper. In this, Plato asserts that philosophy encompasses all things. Philosophy concerns itself with the nature of justice, political regimes, knowledge, the soul, human passions and emotions, aesthetics, as well as the nature of laws and how laws emerge, develop, or where the source of laws derive. This is Plato’s principal concern in the first part of the Laws (Books I-III) – an examination of what is: What is the source of laws?
Plato’s dialogue takes place on the island of Crete, and one of the first noticeable features of this dialogue is that Socrates is not present. The principal question that is being taken up in the Laws is what is the metaphysic to Law itself? What is, in other words. What is the source of the laws of Crete? Do the laws emerge arbitrarily at the discretion and power of the ruling class? Do laws emerge organically from the politeia, and in doing so, reflect the ideals and culture of the city from which it emerged? Or do the laws have a more “supernatural” origo, e.g. Logos? Aristotle famously argues for the organic evolution of law as embodying the fundamental ethos: beliefs and practices, of a given society. Aristotle, again, is not breaking with Plato, but is seen as giving substance to Plato. Plato asserts that while it is true that law takes on the substances of the politeia, that this is not the source of law in of itself. Rather, universal reason is the source of law. Plato argues that laws aim at something – that is, laws have an aim for us. Thus, the laws embody a teleological aspect that reflects our own ontology.
I. The Metaphysics of Laws: God (Reason) or Humans (Passions)
The question as to what the first principle of law is set out at the very beginning of the dialogue when the Athenian stranger strolls in and asks, “Tell me, Strangers, is a God or some man supposed to be the author of your laws?” This is a question of metaphysics with profound implications. Is something transcendent, i.e. a god, the author laws. Or are men the authors of laws.
The question may not seem striking at first, but it is important to remember believes that the Cosmos is governed by Reason and that there is a rational order to the world and all things that are encompassed by it, this would include us. If there is a rational and orderly world, then it stands to reason that there is an end to which is directs – or to use more neo-Platonic language, calls – all that encompass it to participate and orient itself toward. We should remember that Plato is a rationalist, and that he is a eudemonistic teleogian – that is, happiness is our end, we can know this through rational introspection, and that our coming to wisdom or knowledge is integral to the growth and expansion of happiness which is principally rooted in one’s soul.
If we recall from The Republic, knowledge and justice are found in the soul of a human rather than in things external to him. Plato is essentially arguing this: laws that conform to Reason (Logos) with the end aim of happiness are proper laws. Humans are not the author of such laws, but Wisdom would be the author of such laws. On the other hand, human-crafted laws that are not in conformity to this would not really be laws in the true sense. They might be “civil” laws in a legal sense, but since they are not guided by reason with the end of internal dignity and happiness in their sight, then such laws aren’t really laws since they negate the metaphysic to Law itself. Cleinias and Magillus agree that something transcendent is the author of law, and that human law should ideally participate with that transcendent order. There is also commentary about the role of tradition with regard to law, but that is not too important to us in this analysis of Book I (and there are many analyses one can have over any of Plato’s dialogues – this is what makes them so rich and thought provoking).
The Athenian Stranger presses on the first principle of laws and whether they conform to Logos or man-made social construction (here is the theme of social construction appearing once again in a not so subtle way). The Athenian begins questioning over the problem of familial laws. This causes Cleinias and Magillus to begin thinking deeper about the nature of their laws that they have inherited. Who should be the ruler of the household? Who should distribute the tasks and goods of the household? When is it appropriate to go to war to defend the household? These are all questions the Athenian stranger presents to solicit introspection and responses from Cleinias and Magillus.
A question is asked, “Now, which would be the better judge-one who destroyed the bad and appointed the good to govern themselves; or one who, while allowing the good to govern, let the bad live, and made them voluntarily submit? Or third, I suppose, in the scale of excellence might be placed a judge, who, finding the family distracted, not only did not destroy any one, but reconciled them to one another for ever after, and gave them laws which they mutually observed, and was able to keep them friends.” Cleinias responds that the third option would be best. The reason for this, pardon the pun, is because peace is that which is reasonable. Humans seek peace because rational beings would seek peace. Thus, reason is the first principle of law (properly speaking).
II. The End to Which Law and Politics Serve: Peace or War?
The issue of whether laws and political institutions aim for war or peace then begins to dominate the conversation. Cleinias has just admitted, through rational reasoning, that laws or dictates that seek reconciliation (peace) would be just and reasonable. Yet, he still struggles with how to reconcile this with the fact that laws and political institutions seem to aim – not at peace – but at war. As Cleinias himself interjects after hearing the Athenian Stranger give a brief explanation as to why war is unconducive to happiness, “I suppose that there is truth, Stranger, in that remark of yours; and yet I am greatly mistaken if war is not the entire aim and object of our own institutions, and also of the Lacedaemonian.” Is politics and political laws about reasonableness and peacefulness form which the attainment of wisdom and happiness are aimed for, or are laws and political orders established out of fear with the aims of war and conquest in mind? Through the Athenian Stranger, Plato is telling us that reasonable laws are the only true laws, and such laws would be those that aim at reconciliation and togetherness (as part of our social animus). Peace should be the end of law because peace is that which is rational and also allows for the possibility of happiness through the pursuits of love and education (Plato deals with education in Book II).
The purpose of the exchanges is to also bring uneasiness to the interlocutors concerning their statement that God was the author of their laws (i.e. Reason), but through the back and forth dialogue, they are rapidly realizing that this is a farce and that laws have likely been established to the benefit the powerful and malevolent. Plato then moves into the discuss the justness and reasonableness of political leaders. As the Athenian Stranger states, “And in like manner no one can be a true statesman, whether he aims at the happiness of the individual or state, who looks only, or first of all, to external warfare; nor will he ever be a sound legislator who orders peace for the sake of war, and not war for the sake of peace.”
Peace is the paramount virtue, although there are others virtues. The statesman is meant to look at all the virtues when weighing political decisions and legislation. In sum, any legislation that would be unconducive to the cultivation of virtue is not really a law but something that barbarizes humans and plays to human passion and emotion. On this note, Plato sees the hierarchy as virtues as such: health, beauty, strength, and wealth among the natural virtues, and then from among the transcendent virtues, Wisdom, rational moderation and inquiry, justice, and courage. These virtues descend in importance from top to bottom rather than from bottom up. For example, health leads to beauty, health and beauty lead to strength, health, beauty, and strength help make the acquisition of wealth possible (though this does mean wealth-based ethics and laws are the worst form of laws for a society – this is also a continued critique from wealth-oriented notions of justice that came from The Republic).
Likewise, wisdom is the highest of the transcendent virtues, and only from having attained wisdom can one properly understand rational inquiry and moderate appropriately (i.e. know when not to engage in “rational” conversation with others because it is unwise to do so because it will get nowhere), and from wisdom stems justice and courage. In this sense, Plato’s defense of how to achieve courage and phronesis is not to dissimilar from Aristotle insofar that knowledge plays a key role in cultivating virtue, and how knowledgeable one truly is, is reflected and embodied in their actions and how they interact with others. Union with wisdom, and union with health – which is through beauty – is the goal of the virtuous life and reflective intellect; this too should be the aim of laws and statesmen because then laws would have a reflection of transcendent character and nature to them.
III. Pleasure can be a Result of Virtue and Moderation
What follows from this is an extending discussion on pleasure and the nature of pleasure itself. Plato argues, contra the stoics and cynics, that pleasure is important and an integral aspect of human life. (This is especially true in Symposium.) There is nothing wise in attempt to purgate pleasure from one’s body. However, pleasure in its most formal and proper place is to be united with wisdom – from this true pleasure is derived and this uniting of pleasure with wisdom takes knowledge, fortitude, and virtue in of itself. So pleasure has an end in wisdom and helps to cultivate virtue. (This idea is also common in Jewish and Christian philosophy.) This is also an esoteric critique of hedonistic philosophy, and anticipates the rise of Epicureanism which is slowly forming in Greek thought as an alternative to the political-oriented living of the sophists. But for Plato, there is no virtue or wisdom in living a life like an oyster.
At the same time as the Athenian gives a very Platonic account of how pleasure comes from participation through wisdom and the cultivation of the virtue necessary in achieving this, Magillus attempts to defend the austere Spartanism of Sparta. “I admit, Stranger, that your words are well spoken, and I hardly know what to say in answer to you; but still I think that the Spartan lawgiver was quite right in forbidding pleasure.” The Athenian Stranger rebuts that there is no wisdom in living a life devoid of passion, and also asserts a life that can properly embrace passion does not mean one has forgone moderation (which is the error of the Spartans in associating moderation and virtue with the absence of pleasure). As the Athenian Stranger notes, the Persians, who engage in licentious lifestyles and activities, still have more moderation and wisdom than the Spartanized warlike Barbarians.
Magillus responds by citing countless examples of Spartan military success, to which the Athenian also rebuts. This dialogue exchange over whether virtue and moderation can be shown through military prowess is interesting – and also reaches back to the earlier discussion as to the aim of law and politics. The Spartans, as Magillus is interpreting their society as being and embodying, aims at war rather than peace. Thus, the Spartan way is in serious error and is totally predicated on human desire for conquest and to find glory and “happiness” through vanity and material pursuits (e.g. war and conquest).
In connection to the issue of the end of politics and laws being peace, this does not mean that one need not have a militarized aspect to its society. In fact, one needs a military for defense and to keep the peace. But too much militarization inevitably pushes one into a war-like mentality. This is the warning here.
Furthermore, Plato highlights the tensions between laws, institutions, and political order and their relationship to humans. Laws, institutions, and political bodies often attempt to twist and mold humans into what the benefactors of irrational laws, institutions, and political bodies seek. This is a continued critique of the social contract and the sophists whom Plato was critiquing in Republic. Laws, institutions, and body politics that over emphasize militarism, conflict mentality, and a dog-eat-dog civil life (e.g. ethical egoism and economic egoism) inevitably lead to an irrationalization of society. Humans are, properly to be in union with rational laws leading to peace, order, and happiness, but humans are often subject to laws in an oppressive and de-humanizing manner (i.e. promoting the suppression of rational inquiry, dialectic, and cultivation of ordered passion and attainment and practice of virtue).
IV. “The Puppet of the Gods”
The ending of Book I takes a turn away from the political and philosophical (in the most visible sense) and pivots to the artistic and nature of religious life and festivals. The question that arises is whether the arts produce virtue, or have virtue in mind. The Athenian Stranger answers in the affirmative. The art highlights how well-educated an individual is. Art makes references to the intellectual culture and historical customs and traditions of a people, so wisdom is wrapped up through the arts.
Perhaps the most interesting and oft-disputed stories in Plato is the “Puppet of the Gods” speech. Are we not the playthings of the gods?
We need to know something about “religion” in the world of Antiquity vs. religion as we’ve inherited thanks to Judaism and Christianity. The gods as envisioned by the pagans (contra someone like Plato who was a monotheist and regarded the pagan gods as essentially twisted idols) were not rational but irrational and passionate. Ancient religion in Greece and Rome focused on the rage, passion, and emotions of the gods. It is completely reversal to the Judeo-Christian portrait where God is that which is rational and orderly (and entirely transcendent). Pagan religion celebrated the emotion tour de force of the gods and considered the passions and emotions to be transcendent (hence why the gods are given such passionate and emotional character in the Greco-Roman literature: Iliad, Odyssey, Aeneid). By contrast, humans are rational animals in Plato’s account. Ancient religion is about the wild, chaotic, and licentious. The push toward rational religion, which occurs through the Greek philosophers, but especially in Judaism and Christianity, is about the ordering of the passions to serve wisdom and the end of wisdom. That is the conflict at hand here in Plato’s account of being “puppets of the gods.” To whom do we really serve: the true God of reason and wisdom, or the false gods of wild human passions?
Ancient religion came in three principally forms: popular religion (e.g. what we have since remembered as paganism) which is what was just described, the fertility cults, and filial pietism (ancestor worship). The other half of ancient religion remembered as paganism are the naturalistic cyclical religions that centered on the cycles of the seasons (the fertility cults). Essentially the fertility cults and fertility religions which held prominence because of the need for the seasons to come at the right times for the well-being of ancient agrarian society. You probably have same vague familiarity with this so I am not going to go into detail about fertility cult practices.
Then there was philosophical religion, the religion of the mind and the transcendent. This is also closer to the Hebraic model emerging in Judea, but what is remembered as philosophical religion in the ancient world are the theologies being advanced by the likes of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and Plotinus (the “god of the philosophers” as it is remembered sometimes). With Christianity’s rise in the ancient Near East and Hellenic Mediterranean World much of Greco-Roman philosophical religion gets incorporated into it. There were also a multitude of mystery religions. These were more elaborate in ritual, closed in membership, and esoteric in knowledge. Some of the more famous mystery religions were the Cult of Isis as well as Gnostic movements (both non-Christian and Christian forms of Gnosticism). That said, as far as we can tell, the mystery religions mirrored the philosophical religions insofar that they seemed to largely teach self-discipline, ordering of body and mind, and pursuit of wisdom through discipline and ordering body and mind (except for the Gnostics). Plato is not critiquing mystery religion here either (and he was probably unaware of it in his lifetime). The most common form of religious practice in Antiquity was filial pietism and ancestor worship. Plato is not critiquing that either.
The passage over being the puppets of the gods is a critique of the absurdity of pagan religion by Plato, and also a bleak assessment of human nature and society. As rational animals who should give ourselves to wisdom and reason, we remain dangled on the strings of the passions of the gods. We cannot escape the captivating and enthralling power of the passions. The struggle for wisdom and reason, in Plato, is the struggle to properly order passion and desire to the end of wisdom (as we just covered in the passages where the Athenian Stranger defends the pleasurable as having an end in wisdom and virtue). True Divinity is the rational in Plato’s account, and insofar that the pagan gods are given over to lust, passion, and emotion – which is accounted for in pagan religious rituals – we are slaves to the passions or the false gods. As classicist and philosopher Julia Annas explained in Platonic Ethics: Old and New in citing this speech explains, “This is what it meant to be controlled by the divine, namely to control ourselves by reason, and not be at the mercy of the non-rational aspects of ourselves.” The bleaker assessment comes back to us insofar that law is meant to be authored by rationality, but it should be becoming clear that even if we like to this is the case with our laws, it is not. We ascribed unvirtuous and unintelligible laws to divinity, or reason, while they are really laws that cave to passion, emotion, and advance certain power interests in society (e.g. the sophists).
Plato is again digging at the fact that laws being ascribed to the gods (who are irrational and entirely controlled by their own passions and emotions) means that the laws are not the product of transcendent reason and order (which is true divinity). Yet, the passage is a double sword because, while we have mistakenly identified passion and emotion (which requires no virtue or knowledge of) which swings us violently side to side, true divinity (the true puppet master) is that of reason and tugs us toward reason and order and only this is worthy of being divine as it would be absolutely transcendent. According to Plato, the true God of Reason manifests in the “other gods” (like during the Festivals of Dionysus) where we are tested to show our wisdom and virtue in how we conduct ourselves in such artistic and festival events; the truly wise and virtuous has ordered his passions to reason and can enjoy the festival as he is a moderate and virtuous man, whereas the devotees of Dionysus are wild and licentious, have not ordered themselves to reason, and have shown themselves to be unvirtuous and unwise in their being slaves to the passions. As Prof. Annas explains again, “Thus the message of the puppet image is meant to be inspiring rather than depressing: insofar as we identify reason, the divine within us [(i.e. “the voice of God”)], we can control and change ourselves.” While few people achieve this level of wisdom and order to their lives, it is nevertheless open to all.
There is nothing virtuous, orderly, or even conservative about pagan religion then in Plato’s account because it surrenders harmony, order, and the intellect over to the passions which exhausts itself in disappointment, regret, confusion as to what virtue and wisdom is, as well as disorder in personal life and public society. The gods are “false gods” precisely because they allure you away from reason and capture you with passion – signs of your lack of wisdom, virtue, and moderation. The reason for such festivals and arts are so that you can struggle with reason and passion, pleasure and wisdom, test your fortitude, virtue, moderation and wisdom in how you conduct yourself in such events. For this reason, and only this reason, the festivals are to be celebrated and are worthwhile. It gives us the opportunity to “control and change ourselves,” and properly order our pleasure seeking passions to wisdom.
V. Reason: The Metaphysic of (Natural) Law
Book I of The Laws is Plato’s first systematic attempt at establishing a theory of natural law. He asserts that happiness is our end, and this is tied to reason. Laws are divine insofar that they conform to reason with the purpose of happiness and the cultivation of moderation, order, and virtue in one’s life and also one’s city. Laws are not laws, in a deep philosophical sense (although they would be laws in a legal and positivistic sense), if they do not conform to transcendent wisdom with the aim of cultivating virtue and pushing us toward happiness which is the result of the union with wisdom.
Although never named, Plato’s first book of The Laws rebuts the hedonism and Cynicism (who have no virtue and moderation, nor even any true wisdom in their calls to depart the city and engage in a life of hedonism), and he also assails pagan religion as being confused and associating non-virtuous behavior and wild passions to divinity which is counter-productive to wisdom, true happiness, and ordering one’s life in accordance to natural law. Plato directly challenges the austere lifestyle of confused reasoning from the Spartans too, and in doing so, implicitly rebuts the cynics again and anticipates the rise of the stoics and his work can also be read as rejecting the stoic view of life which is intellectual derivative of the austere Spartan lifestyle. (On this note, this is why we, in philosophy, need to command the history of philosophy – so we can see who are being critiqued without being named.)
The question we wrestle with from Plato is this: is Law only the purely rational? This is undoubtedly true of Natural Law, but what about civil law? Do civil laws need to conform to reason and Natural Law to be understood, properly, as law? The Laws is Plato’s densest dialogue, and also his most mature. The fuller account of Plato’s thoughts on epistemology, metaphysics, natural law, and human nature are riddled throughout the text. In essence, Law as a reflection of Natural Law aims to cultivate virtue, knowledge, attainment of wisdom, from which moderation in one’s life and moderation in society flow, all of which are the conduits that direct us to happiness. This, and only this, would be rational, and deserving of being understood as proper law.
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Paul Krause is the editor-in-chief of VoegelinView. He is writer, classicist, and historian. He has written on the arts, culture, classics, literature, philosophy, religion, and history for numerous journals, magazines, and newspapers. He is the author of Finding Arcadia, The Odyssey of Love and the Politics of Plato, and a contributor to the College Lecture Today and Making Sense of Diseases and Disasters. He holds master’s degrees in philosophy and religious studies (biblical studies & theology) from the University of Buckingham and Yale, and a bachelor’s degree in economics, history, and philosophy from Baldwin Wallace University.
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